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The Demise of the Implied
Federal Preemption Doctrine




Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of the doctrine of federal preemp-
tion has been its historically inconsistent application. Until recently the
approaches to questions of preemption have been myriad and the results
diverse. The Burger Court, however, has been carefully formulating a uni-
form approach to preemption questions. Several of its recent decisions have
marked a change in the doctrine. This process has culminated in a recent
unanimous Supreme Court decision that establishes a viable and uniform
standard by which to decide future preemption questions. On February 25,
1976, the United States Supreme Court upheld a California statute1 that
prohibits employers from knowingly employing aliens not entitled to legal
residence in the United States.' The Court held that the subject of California
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1. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (West Supp. 1976). The statute reads in full as fol-
lows:
"(a) No employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to
lawful residence in the United States if such employment would have an ad-
verse effect on lawful resident workers.
"(b) A person found guilty of a violation of subdivision (a) is punishable
by a fine of not less than two hundred dollars ($200) nor more than five
hundred dollars ($500) for each offense.
"(c) The foregoing provisions shall not be a bar to civil action against
the employer based upon violation of subdivision (a)."
2. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
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Labor Code section 2805 was not preempted either by the United States
Constitution3 or federal immigration law.4 That decision, De Canas v.
Bica,5 has opened the door for enactment of state statutes imposing sanc-
tions on employers of aliens not authorized to work in the United States. In
upholding the statute, the Court recognized that in the absence of federal
legislation, states possess broad authority under their police powers to regu-
late employment to protect the domestic labor force.6
This article will focus on the relationship between immigration law and
section 2805 of the California Labor Code in light of the preemption doc-
trine articulated in De Canas. A discussion of the impact of illegal aliens,
both nationally and in California, will establish the background for examina-
tion of section 2805. Consideration of recent preemption cases and their
effect on the two traditional aspects of the preemption doctrine, occupation
and conflict, will reveal that De Canas is a continuation of the Supreme
Court's current inclination to reconcile concurrent federal and state legisla-
tive schemes. This examination will show that the Supreme Court is man-
ifesting its responsiveness to urgent state needs. The principal contention is
that the Court properly construed the power of the states to impose criminal
and civil sanctions on employers who knowingly employ illegal aliens as a
legitimate state prerogative to protect the welfare of the domestic labor
force. The appropriate resolution of the conflict question on remand will be
considered along with the implications De Canas presents for California's
neighboring states and for Congress.
I. Background of Section 2805
A. The Nationwide Impact of Illegal Aliens
The United States Department of Labor, summarizing the impact of
persons illegally present in this country, has observed that illegal aliens:
(1) obtain jobs that otherwise would be performed by American citizens; (2)
depress the wages and impair the working conditions of American citizens;
(3) increase the burden of American taxpayers through added welfare costs;
(4) reduce the effectiveness of employee organizations;' (5) secure jobs,
3. "The Congress shall have Power. . . To establish an uniform Rule of Naturali-
zation .... ." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of
the Land .... ." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
4. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 101-407, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1970).
5. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
6. Id. at 356.
7. Illegal Mexican aliens have been used as strikebreakers and in that capacity have
made it more difficult for farm laborers to unionize. Washington Post, Sept. 23, 1974,
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services, and resources directly and indirectly from many federal and state
programs, thus diverting scarce resources from American citizens; and as
aggressive, enterprising workers with low wage demands,' constitute an
unskilled group ripe for exploitation by employers
§ C, at 3, col. 6. Farmworker organizer Cesar Chavez has stated: "The illegal workers
from Mexico are a severe problem. It is a problem that is out of control. . . . We say,
let them come in with their families, if the country needs them. Let them be legal. Then
they'll stand up for their rights." Severo, The Flight of the Wetbacks, N.Y. Times, Mar.
10, 1974, § 6 (Magazine), at 81. The Supreme Court's recognition that illegal aliens frus-
trate legal resident alien workers, especially in such occupations as farm work, is expres-
sed in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). See also Greene, Im-
migration Law and Rural Poverty-The Problems of the Illegal Entrant, 1969 DUKE L.J.
475, 488-89.
8. See Illegal Aliens: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1356 (1972) (statement of Robert Brown, Associate Man-
power Administrator, United States Training and Employment Services, Dep't of Labor)
[hereinafter cited as 1972 Hearings]. See also Illegal Aliens: Hearings on H.R. 982 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975
Hearings].
Other adverse effects of the presence of illegal aliens include the overburdening of
federal and state public assistance programs as well as other benefit and service programs,
including the public schools. In California the total additional expense for educating 659
illegal alien students in Orange County was $2.6 million; San Diego County said its med-
ical cost for the care of illegal aliens was $578,307 in 1974 and was expected to rise to
over $600,000 in 1975; and two San Diego hospitals reported spending a total of $1.9
million last year on treatment of illegal aliens. Medical costs in Los Angeles County ex-
ceeded $8 million in 1974. 1975 Hearings, supra at 158; Address by Leonard F. Chap-
man, Jr., Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, before the Los Angeles
World Affairs Council, in Los Angeles (Apr. 10, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Chapman
Address]. In his address, Commissioner Chapman pointed out that certain California
members of Congress had introduced a bill to require the federal government to absorb
such medical costs. Chapman stated that the California sponsors claim that California
spends more than $20 million annually in medical care for illegal aliens.
Additionally, an adverse social and political impact is reportedly attributable to the
presence of illegal Mexican aliens in the Southwest. For example, it has made accultura-
tion difficult for the Chicano community. See Salinas & Torres, The Undocumented Mexi-
can Alien: A Legal, Social, and Economic Analysis, 13 Hous. L. REv. 863, 881-84
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Salinas & Torres].
9. A congressional committee has made this observation as well: "Because the il-
legal aliens are themselves in violation of the law and risk deportation, or, in the case of
illegal entry, criminal penalties, unscrupulous employers are able to exploit them without
fear of being reported. According to the testimony, this exploitation takes a number of
forms, including substandard wages and the denial of health protection, insurance, over-
time, and other fringe benefits. The net effect is not only the displacement of American
labor becausq of unfair competition, but, in the long run, a depression of wages and a
lower standard of living where a supply of cheap alien labor is readily and dependably
available." SUBCOMM. No. I OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 92D
CONG., 1ST SESS., ILLEGAL ALIENS, A REVIEW OF HEARINGS CONDUCTED DURING
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The use of illegal alien labor is often accompanied by abusive and
unfair labor practices. For example, illegal aliens who are apprehended by
immigration officials usually leave the country under the "voluntary depar-
ture" procedure.1" The illegal entrant is advised of his right to a deportation
hearing, and if he waives the right he is quickly processed and returned to
his country of origin. Employers who make a practice of hiring illegal aliens
are aware of this procedure and rely on it to reduce payroll expenditures.
When the alien is apprehended, the employer frequently denies that he owes
the worker back wages, knowing that the worker will leave the country
within hours of apprehension and will be unable to pursue a wage claim.11
While it is difficult to obtain accurate data on illegal aliens, the scope of
their impact can be described."2 The Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) apprehended 788,145 illegal aliens in the United States during fiscal
year 197413 and 766,600 in 1975."4 The former Commissioner of the INS,
Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., however, estimates the total number of illegal
aliens in the United States at between four and five million and possibly as
many as ten or twelve million.' 5 While it has been suggested that illegal
THE 92D CONGRESS 12 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter cited as REVIEW OF
HEARINGS].
The Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens reports: "For obvious reasons
illegals are vulnerable to exploitation by unscrupulous employers. They can hardly afford
to report substandard work-related housing or dangerous working conditions to OSHA
[Occupational Safety & Health Administration] nor can they report minimum wage viola-
tions even though they are theoretically protected. Numerous horror stories circulate re-
garding employers who report illegal aliens to INS [Immigration & Naturalization Service]
in order to avoid paying wages...." DOMESTIC COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON ILLEGAL
ALIENS, PRELIMINARY REPORT 148 (1976) [hereinafter cited as DOMESTIC COUNCIL].
See also H.R. REP. No. 108, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973); Briggs, Mexican Migration
and the U.S. Labor Market: A Mounting Issue for the Seventies, 3 STUD. HUMAN
RESOURCE DEV. 26 (1975) (citing J. SAMORA, LOS MOJADOS: THE WETBACK STORY
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Briggs].
10. Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1970). See also
8 C.F.R. § 242 (1976). The voluntary departure procedure is by far the most common
sanction. In 1974, 718,740 aliens were required to depart without issuance of a formal
order and only 18,824 were formally deported. [1974] INS ANN. REP. 15 [hereinafter
cited as [1974] INS REP].
11. See Ortega, Plight of the Mexican Wetback, 58 A.B.A.J. 251, 252 (1972); note
8 supra.
12. See, e.g., Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., Illegal Immigration and the American Labor
Force: The Use of "Soft" Data for Analysis, Conference of Measurement of Social and
Economic Data and Public Policy, University of Texas, Austin, Texas, (Apr. 10-11,
1975). See generally DOMESTIC COUNCIL, supra note 9.
13. [19741 INS REP., supra note 10, at 9.
14. See [1975] INS ANN. REP. [hereinafter cited as [1975] INS REPORT].
15. 1975 Hearings, supra note 8, at 36 (statement of Leonard Chapman, Jr.).
Former Attorney General William B. Saxbe stated that approximately seven to thirteen
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aliens earn $10 billion a year, 6 Representative Peter Rodino, chairman of
the House Subcommittee on Immigration, states that illegal aliens send an
estimated $10 billion in earnings out of the country'" and evade at least $100
million in income taxes.' 8
The influx of illegal aliens is particularly acute in those states bordering
Mexico. One commentator has asserted that "the primary characteristic of
the migration of Mexicans . . .is not legal migration, but rather it is illegal
migration."' 9 Thus, Mexicans accounted for 709,959, or 90 percent, of the
illegal aliens arrested in 197420 and 680,392, or 89 percent, of those arrested
in 1975." Commissioner Chapman suggests that Mexican nationals com-
prise half of his estimate of the number of illegal aliens presently in the
country.22 The INS, the agency in charge of enforcing federal regulation of
aliens, has referred to the illegal entries across the southern border as a
"continuing surge"2 3 and admits its inability to handle the situation: "Per-
sons are illegally entering the country across our borders and through the
ports of entry by the millions, far outstripping INS capability to enforce
adequately the laws pertaining to entry and residence.''24 The service is
simply too understaffed and ill-equipped to control effectively a problem of
this magnitude. 5
million illegal aliens are in the country. Illegal Aliens Cost One Million Jobs, Orlando
Sentinel Star, Oct. 31, 1974, at 6-A, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Illegal Aliens]. The
Christian Science Monitor reports estimates ranging from three to twelve million. Chris-
tian Science Monitor, Mar. 20, 1975, at 12, col. 1.
16. McLellan & Boggs, Illegal Aliens: A Story of Human Misery, AM.
FEDERATIONIST 23 (Aug. 1974); see Illegal Immigration: A Gldbal Problem,
Washington Post, Nov. 13, 1974, reprinted in 1975 Hearings, supra note 8, at 74.
17. N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1974, reprinted in 1975 Hearings, supra note 8, at 92.
Estimates put the number of illegal aliens holding jobs at approximately one million. See,
e.g., Illegal Aliens, supra note 15; TIME, May 19, 1975, at 14-15; Christian Science
Monitor, Mar. 20, 1975, at 12, col. 1.
18. In 1974 the IRS conducted a study of the potential tax liabilities of 1,699 aliens
detained at INS detention facilities. From 1,090 returns secured, the INS assessed the tax
due at $247,696, and collected $168,469. DOMESTIC COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 103.
19. Briggs, supra note 9, at 3. Since the mid-1930's, illegal Mexican immigration
has exceeded legal immigration. See J. SAMORA, Los MOJADOs: THE WETBACK STORY
197 (1971).
20. [1974] INS REP., supra note 10, at 9.
21. [1975] INS ANN. REP., supra note 14, at 13.
22. Chapman Address, supra note 9; 1975 Hearings, supra note 8, at 73.
23. [1974] INS REP., supra note 10, at iii.
24. Id.
25. The director of the Houston district office of the INS reported to one commen-
tator that on pursuing telephone complaints concerning undocumented aliens his office
discovered that the two agents who cover the Houston area were still investigating leads
received two months earlier. Salinas & Torres, supra note 8, at 915.
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Justice White of the United States Supreme Court has noted the failure
of the border checkpoint system to detect illegal entries: "'The entire system
. . .has been notably unsuccessful in deterring or stemming this heavy
flow .... Perhaps the Judiciary should not strain to accommodate the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the needs of a system which at
best can demonstrate only minimal effectiveness . "..."26 Thus, even
though the federal legislative scheme governing aliens is comprehensive and
provides both criminal27 and civil2" sanctions against illegal aliens and crim-
inal sanctions against those who harbor them,29 the federal government has
been unable to abate the influx of illegal aliens. The most serious factor
hindering effective control of illegal aliens is the absence from the legisla-
tive scheme of a proscription on their employment.3" The Domestic Council
Committee on Illegal Aliens has noted that the "availability of work and the
lack of sanctions for hiring illegal aliens is the single most important incen-
tive to [their] migration . . . . -'
It was in the foregoing setting of federal ineffectiveness that California
confronted its illegal alien problem. All available evidence indicates that
illegal aliens from Mexico come to the United States primarily to obtain
employment.32 California has a particular attraction for illegal aliens be-
cause of its common border with Mexico"3 and its extensive agricultural
economy, which includes 81,000 square miles of farms in the San Joaquin
Valley alone. 4 In fact, Commissioner Chapman estimates that at least 1.5
26. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 915 (1975) (White, J., concur-
ring).
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1970).
28. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1970).
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1970). In-Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F.2d 924, 926
(9th Cir. 1975), the court held that section 274 of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1970)) is
solely penal in nature and that no private right of action is implied thereunder. See also
Flores v. George Braun Packing Co., 482 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1973); Chavez v. Freshpict
Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
30. There is no federal prohibition of employment of illegal aliens even though a
recent Gallup poll revealed that 80% of those surveyed favored such a law. Houston
Chronicle, July 28, 1976, at 14, col. 1. Such legislation has been debated in Congress
since 1951, when the Truman Commission first recommended it. For a discussion of fed-
eral legislation currently pending, see notes 174-76 and accompanying text infra.
31. DOMESTIC COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 42 (emphasis added).
32. See, e.g., 1972 Hearings, supra note 8, at 1119; REVIEW OF HEARINGS,
supra note 9, at 5. In fact, Congressman Leo J. Ryan observed that "the agricultural
economy is based on the use of illegal aliens at a fairly low wage." N.Y. Times, Dec.
11, 1974, at 32, col. 2.
33. For example, California's San Ysidro crossing is the busiest land crossing in
the United States, with 38 million people crossing annually. The border patrol has as-
signed 200 officers to cover this 3% of the 2000 mile border. One-third of the illegal
aliens caught are arrested there. Miami Herald, Jan. 31, 1977, § b. at 3, col. 3.
34. Washington Star-News, Nov. 16, 1974, at A-8, reprinted in 1975 Hearings,
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million illegal aliens are now residing in California. 5
California's recent economic history is replete with the influx of illegal
aliens and their impact on the economy. In 1971, when 595,000 citizens
were unemployed in California, illegal aliens were earning approximately
$100 million in wages.36 A 1970 United States Department of Labor study
estimated the sum attributable annually to wages of illegal aliens in Califor-
nia agriculture at more than $180 million.3" The study reported that approx-
imately 67,437 illegal entrants were apprehended in California in fiscal
1970,38 while a 1973 report stated that the United States border patrol in
California averaged over 11,000 arrests of illegal aliens each month.39 A
more recent report stated that the border patrol had been apprehending 200
illegal aliens per day in Los Angeles and Orange counties before funds were
cut, so that only 75 to 100 could be apprehended each day. In addition,
approximately 200,000 illegal aliens were caught in Southern California in
1974, about 180,000 of them in the Los Angeles area. About 32,000 illegal
aliens are employed in San Francisco, and 120,000 are believed to be doing
agricultural work in California's central valley.4 Moreover, INS reports that
Los Angeles alone has approximately 135,000 illegally employed aliens.41
These figures indicate the conditions giving rise to the enactment of section
2805 of the California Labor Code.
B. Section 2805 and Its Raison d'Etre
One of the early efforts in California to diminish the impact of illegal
aliens was initiated by a group of Mexican-American farmworkers. 42 In
1968 they filed a lawsuit4 seeking to enforce in the illegal alien context a
state statute proscribing unlawful or unfair business practices.44 They con-
tended that it was unfair competition for an employer knowingly to employ
illegal aliens in preference to domestic labor. After comprehensively review-
ing the extent and impact of illegal aliens on the employment opportunities
supra note 8, at 73.
35. Chapman Address, supra note 8.
36. 1972 Hearings, supra note 8, at 208.
37. Id. at 100.
38. Id.
39. Washington Star-News, Nov. 18, 1974, reprinted in 1975 Hearings, supra note
8, at 68.
40. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 3, 1975, at 29.
41. Present Scope of the Illegal Alien Problem, CONG. DIG. (Jan. 8, 1975).
42. See generally Cardenas, United States Immigration Policy Toward Mexico: An
Historical Perspective, 2 CHICANO L. REv. 66, 86-89 (1975); Note, State Regulation of
the Employment of Illegal Aliens: A Constitutional Approach, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 565
(1973).
43. Diaz v. Kay-Dix Ranch, 9 Cal. App. 3d 588, 88 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1970).
44. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369(2) (West Supp. 1977) provides: "Any person per-
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of domestic labor, the court concluded that "[T]he domestic farmworkers'
need for protection against the job competition of illegal entrants is undeni-
able, -the public benefits palpable." 45
In particularly strong language, the court described the condition of
domestic farmworkers:
Ever since the depression era of the thirties, the dismal plight of the
American farmworker has been heavily annotated in an interminable
flow of congressional hearings and reports, public surveys and social
commentaries. . . .Despite decades of protest and officially expressed
concern, there has been no solution to the dilemma posed by agricul-
ture's heavy, short-term need for manpower and society's inability to
absorb that manpower when agriculture's need is past. From Steinbeck's
Grapes of Wrath to the present, the thin gruel of public welfare handouts
has been farm labor's principal progress to the remote goal of social
justice.46
The court then noted that the general plight of domestic farmworkers is
compounded by the influx of illegal aliens:
Capture of a sizeable share of the farm employment market by invading
illegal entrants is a superimposed source of deprivation. The Immigration
and Nationality Act . . .expresses a national policy to preserve the
available employment market for domestic workers. Partial expropria-
tion of the farm job market by illegal entrants represents an abject failure
of national policy. . . . [Such failure] must be ascribed to the self-
imposed impotence of our national government.4"
In spite of the court's appreciation of the problem, relief was denied.48
Shortly thereafter, two similar attempts were also unsuccessful.49
Failing in the judicial forum, California's farmworkers went into the
legislature and there succeeded. Recognizing the limitations of the federal
system and the acute problems created by the presence of illegal aliens in
California, the state legislature in 1971 attempted to alleviate the problem by
enacting section 2805 of the Labor Code, which prohibits any employer
from knowingly employing aliens not entitled to legal residence in the
United States. The statute is not confined to the farm labor context inasmuch
forming or proposing to perform an act of unfair competition within this state may be
enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction."
45. 9 Cal. App. 3d at 596, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
46. Id. at 596-97, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 448-49.
47. Id. at 597, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
48. Id. at 599-600, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 450-51. The court denied equitable relief,
favoring the comparative efficacy of eventual federal legislation over the burden an in-
junction would place on employers.
49. Larez v. Oberti, 23 Cal. App. 3d 217, 100 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1972); Cobos v.
Mello-dy Ranch, 20 Cal. App. 3d 947, 98 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1971). Both cases followed
Diaz and denied monetary recovery on the ground that the federal statute creates no pri-
vate right of action.
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as substantial numbers of illegal aliens live in urban areas as well,5" thus
depressing the urban labor market in a variety of industries.
Section 2805 is a limited labor statute that proscribes a specific em-
ployment activity in order to implement a state labor policy designed to
protect California wage earners. It seeks to curtail the influx of illegal
entrants and their partial expropriation of California's labor market, to pro-
tect domestic laborers, and to relieve California citizens of the substantial
tax burdens caused by the severe impact of illegal aliens upon the labor
force. With this legislation California created both criminal and civil sanc-
tions against employers who hire illegal aliens. The statute protects the
state's vital fiscal interests and domestic labor market by forbidding em-
ployers to use workers who, as Congress and others have recognized, de-
press wages and the economy. Section 2805 focuses its regulatory prohibi-
tion directly on the source of the problem, the hiring practices of employers.
California's proximity to the Mexican border gives it an unusually strong
interest in this area, and the federal government's ineffective control of
illegal entry by aliens makes the employment of illegal aliens a legitimate
concern of the state.51
II. The Preemption Doctrine and the De Canas Decision
While the validation of section 2805 in De Canas is notable for its
directly beneficial effect on the California economy in general and on poor
legal immigrants in particular, its greatest significance is that it marks a
major step in a series of cases upholding state laws in areas of concurrent
federal and state legislation.
50. See, e.g., Dolores Canning Co. v. Howard, 40 Cal. App. 3d 673, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 435 (1974).
51. Other states have expressed similar concerns by enacting comparable legisla-
tion. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51k (Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT. § 21-4409
(1974). The Connecticut statute, however, appears to have been declared unconstitutional
as a denial of equal protection to illegal aliens in Marin v. Smith, 376 F. Supp. 608, 609
n.2 (D. Conn. 1974). See also Nowzewski Polish Style Meat Products v. Meskill, 376 F.
Supp. 610 (D. Conn. 1974). In Marin, plaintiffs sought a decree requiring that the INS
decide in a reasonable time whether to grant employment authorization to plaintiffs, who
were aliens temporarily admitted to the United States, so that they would not be in viola-
tion of section 31-51k. 376 F. Supp. at 608. Although it refused to issue the decree, the
district court indica.ed in dictum its belief that the statute was patently invalid, relying on
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); and Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
376 F. Supp. at 609 n.2. The decisions relied on by the court hold only that statutes
singling out lawfully admitted aliens are inherently suspect, subjecting them to strict scru-
tiny. The statutes considered here, on the other hand, distinguish between classes of aliens
on an obviously rational basis-the legality of their entry into the country. Furthermore,
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A. The Parameters of the Preemption Doctrine
When federal and state laws regulate the same subject matter, the
Supreme Court uses two basic approaches to determine the validity of the
specific state law in question. The first approach, often called "occupa-
tion," renders invalid a state attempt to regulate a field "occupied" by
federal law, even if the state scheme does not impair, but rather enhances the
achievement of federal goals.52 The second approach, often called "con-
flict," renders the state attempt invalid only if it conflicts with and impairs
the federal scheme.53
Because a preemption decision based on the fact that Congress has
occupied the field may strike down state laws that aid the federal scheme,
such decisions are not rendered lightly. Unless the court discerns that "the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress" 4 is to occupy the field, it "will not
be presumed that a federal statute was intended to supersede the exercise of
the power of the state. . . . The exercise offederal supremacy is not lightly
to be presumed."51 In other words, before an intent to occupy preemptively
will be found, the text or the legislative history of an act of Congress must
demonstrate that "Congress has unmistakably so ordained.'"'" Without a
very firm foundation based upon an explicit congressional declaration or
readily apparent legislative history, talismanic invocation of phrases such as
"comprehensive federal scheme" would mean "setting aside great numbers
of state statutes to satisfy a congressional purpose which would be only the
product of [a court's] imagination."5 "
Preemption by a finding of occupation is often disparaged:
Little aid can be derived from the vague and illusory but often repeated
formula that Congress "by occupying the field" has excluded from it all
state legislation. Every Act of Congress occupies some field, but we
must know the boundaries of that field before we can say that it has
precluded a state from the exercise of any power reserved to it by the
Constitution. To discover the boundaries we look to the federal statute
itself, read in the light of its constitutional setting and its legislative
history."
the state interest furthered by these statutes would seem sufficiently compelling to over-
come even the exacting strict scrutiny test. See notes 32-50 and accompanying text supra.
52. See generally Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on
Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623, 625, 642-46 (1975) [here-
inafter cited as Preemption Doctrine].
53. Id. at 626, 646-49.
54. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146 (1963)
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
55. New York State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973)
(quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)) (emphasis added).
56. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
57. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1949).
58. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 78-79 (1941).
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Even when Congress acts pursuant to one of the specific powers expressed
in the Constitution, such as the power to regulate copyrights, such exercise
will be held to preempt state copyright law by occupation only if the state
law would be "absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant." 9 In
Goldstein v. California,6 the Court articulated a simple test for repugnancy:
federal power is exclusive over "matters which are necessarily national in
import.'"'" But even when the matters regulated are necessarily national,
preemption of state regulation is not absolutely mandated unless a conflict
between the state and federal regulations will inevitably occur.6"
Historically, when Congress has not clearly manifested an intent to
occupy a particular subject of regulation, a state could legislate pursuant to
its police powers as long as such legislation did not conflict with and frus-
trate federal law." A determination of preemption on the basis of conflict
"turns on the peculiarities and special features of the federal regulatory
scheme in question." 64 For this reason, "prior cases on preemption 'are not
precise guidelines .... ' "65 But some guidelines can be derived from the
conflict cases. First, "to merit judicial rather than cooperative federal-state
resolution [conflicts] should be of substance and not merely trivial or insub-
stantial. "66 Second, when potential conflict appears, a detailed examination
must be undertaken of the respective purposes of the federal law and the
potentially conflicting state law. Such an inquiry is necessary because this
aspect of the doctrine requires preemption of state law "only to the extent
necessary to protect the achievement of the aims" of the federal law.6"
59. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 553 (1973) (quoting THE FEDERALIST
No. 32 (A. Hamilton) 241 (B. Wright ed. 1961)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 554 (emphasis in original).
62. Id.
63. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963) (state labor
legislation not preempted); Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940) (state highway reg-
ulation not preempted); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933) (inspection of cattle for
infectious diseases not preempted); Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 118 (1919) (uphold-
ing state prohibition of shipment of wild ducks by common carrier); Savage v. Jones, 225
U.S. 501 (1912) (upholding state requirement that certain labels reveal package contents);
Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902) (upholding state prohibition on importation of
diseased cattle).
64. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973).
65. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 139
(1973) (quoting City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638-39
(1973)).
66. New York State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 423 n.29
(1973).
67. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127
(1973) (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 361 (1963)).
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Several commentators have suggested that the only proper method of
preemption analysis lies in the conflict approach because of the inherent
pitfalls of discerning legislative intent in the occupation branch of the doc-
trine.68 One commentator observed:
By framing the preemption question in terms of specific congressional
intent the Supreme Court has manufactured difficulties for itself. Apart
from the difficult problem of defining which Congress' and which con-
gressman's intent is relevant this manner of stating the issue suggests that
the preemption question was consciously resolved and that only diligent
effort is needed to reveal the intended solution.69
Analysis by several other commentators suggests that "the proper approach
is to determine whether the continued existence of the state law is consistent
with the general purpose of the federal statute by seeking to define the evil
Congress sought to remedy and the method chosen to effectuate its cure.""0
Thus, the key is a finding of state impairment of the federal purpose: conflict
exists only when "the state regulation 'stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress.' "71
Currently, the Court's preference is to sustain the state law, to the
extent that it does not violate the supremacy clause, 72 by constraining the
pertinent federal purpose and scheme; this is perhaps the very essence of
federalism. This preference, however, has not always existed. It is true that
during the 1930's the Court favored state interests and required a showing of
a clear congressional intent to occupy the subject area or an actual conflict in
order to preempt the challenged state law.73 But Hines v. Davidowitz4
began a period of expansive federal preemption. Hines involved a constitu-
tional challenge to the Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act 75 on the ground
that Congress, by enacting the 1940 Alien Registration Act, 76 had precluded
the states from requiring the registration of aliens. The Supreme Court for
the most part abandoned the clear intent and actual conflict standards and
68. See, e.g., H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PRocEss: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 97-102 (tent. ed. 1958); Note, Pre-
emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV.
208, 209-20 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground].
69. Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground, supra note 68, at 209 (citations omit-
ted).
70. Id. at'210.
71. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963)
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
72. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
73. Pre-emption Doctrine, supra note 52, at 627.
74. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
75. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1801-1806 (Purdon Supp. 1940).
76. Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670.
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defined the primary question as whether, under the factual circumstances of
this particular case, Pennsylvania's law stood as "an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 77
The Court nullified the Pennsylvania act, declaring:
[W]here the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority
in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation and has therein
provided a standard for the registration of aliens, states cannot, inconsis-
tently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or
complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regula-
tions."8
Justice Stone perceived the doctrinal change and cautioned in his dissent:
At a time when the exercise of the federal power is being rapidly ex-
panded through Congressional action, it is difficult to overstate the
importance of safeguarding against such diminution of state power by
vague inferences as to what Congress might have intended if it had
considered the matter or by reference to our own conceptions of a policy
which Congress has not expressed and which is not plainly to be inferred
from the legislation which it has enacted."9
With few exceptions,8" the doctrinal evolution continued, in effect
creating a presumption of federal preemption.81 Recent decisions of the
Supreme Court, however, suggest a change in the progression.
B. Recent Preemption Decisions of the Supreme Court
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court regarding problems of federal
preemption have sought to balance state and federal interests.82 In Goldstein
v. California,83 the Court protected the state's right to prohibit the unau-
thorized reproduction of phonograph records by narrowly construing the
preemptive scope of the copyright clause.84" In affirming a conviction under
a California statute making record piracy a criminal offense, the Court
considered but rejected the constitutional claim that the copyright power, by
its own force and in the absence of any federal regulation of the particular
matter, precluded state legislation. After close examination of the federal
77. 312 U.S. at 67.
78. Id. at 66-67.
79. Id. at 75 (emphasis added).
80. See, e.g., Kessler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962). In
Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), the Cour overruled Kessler.
81. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971); Association of St. Elec. Ry. &
Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S.
663 (1962).
82. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973); Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546 (1973). See generally Preemption Doctrine, supra note 52.
83. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
84. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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copyright statute, the Court held that no conflict existed because Congress
had "left the area unattended." 5 Chief Justice Burger declared that a dis-
tinction is to be made both as to those matters "which are necessarily
national in import," and as to "those situations in which the concurrent
exercise of a power by the Federal Government and the States or by the
States alone may possibly lead to conflicts and those situations where con-
flicts will necessarily arise." 6 He further noted: " 'It is not . . . a mere
possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of powers, but an immediate
constitutional repugnancy that can by implication alienate and extinguish a
pre-existing right of state sovereignty.' "87
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware,as which fol-
lowed Goldstein, involved a New York Stock Exchange rule enacted pur-
suant to the Securities Exchange Act. 9 The rule required arbitration of
claims involving employment termination and the employee's forfeiture of
certain benefits,9 ° in conflict with two California laws that precluded ari-
bitration of wage disputes91 and invalidated forfeiture clauses.92 In resolving
the conflict, the Supreme Court studied the relationship between the purpose
of the exchange rules and the purpose of the California laws. State law
conflicting with the federal law was to be preempted "'only to the extent
necessary to protect the achievement of the aims of the Securities Exchange
Act."93 The employee arbitration rule was held to be ancillary to the pur-
pose of the federal law to insure fair dealing and to protect investors, and it
thus did not preempt state law.94 The Court noted that its "analysis is to be
tempered by the conviction that the proper approach is to reconcile 'the
operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather than holding one
completely ousted.' "'I The Court further noted that its approach was
"supported by decisions extending back to the turn of the century. '"96
85. 412 U.S. at 570.
86. Id. at 554 (emphasis in original).
87. Id. at 555 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (A. Hamilton) 243 (B. Wright
ed. 1961)).
88. 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 78(f) (1970).
90. New York Stock Exchange Rule 347(b).
91. CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West 1971).
92. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1964).
93. 414 U.S. at 127 (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341,
361 (1963)).
94. Id. at 130, 134-36.
95. Id. at 127 (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357
(1963)).
96. Id. at 127 n.8 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growvers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 142 (1963); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440
(1960); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958); Union
Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1944); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912)).
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Finally, in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. ," the Supreme Court
considered whether a conflict existed between the patent clause of the
United States Constitution98 and a state trade secret statute99 that applied to
patentable inventions and would provide a monopoly in perpetuity rather
than for seventeen years, as under the federal patent law. To be void, the
state trade secret law would have to stand "as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress.""'
Clearly the statute was not presumptively void: "Trade secret law and patent
law have co-existed in this country for over one hundred years. Each has its
particular role to play, and the operation of one does not take away from the
need for the other."'' Relying on Goldstein, the Court in Kewanee upheld
the state trade secret statute after examining its purpose, scope of applica-
tion, and effect on various products, and finding no significant conflict
between state law and federal patent policy. The federal purpose of en-
couraging development and public disclosure was not frustrated by the en-
forcement of the state law.
The recent preemption trilogy of Goldstein, Merrill Lynch, and
Kewanee has thus validated state laws in instances when provisions of state
and federal law differed, but the purposes of the two schemes did not
conflict. Moreover, the state laws involved in these cases were upheld even
when the subject matter regulated had implications beyond the state's boun-
daries. These cases thus laid the foundation for the Court's recent decision in
De Canas v. Bica.'0
III. De Canas v. Bica and Its Implications
The De Canas decision marks the latest and most significant step in the
Court's treatment of the preemption doctrine. It is distinguishable from the
preceding trilogy on several grounds. First, De Canas involved a preemp-
tion challenge under the immigration clause."0 3 The strong preference for
federal laws in this area dates back to Hines v. Davidowitz,"' when the
Court observed that "the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less
than the interest of people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that
federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from
97. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
98. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
99. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.51(c) (Page Supp. 1976).
100. 416 U.S. at 493 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
103. Id. at 354-56.
104. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
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local interference." 10 5 Second, the statute... in De Canas not only affects
foreign relations and immigration, albeit indirectly, but also has far-reaching
implications for California's neighboring states. Finally, in De Canas, the
Court not only refrained from analyzing the statute for possible clashes
between the state and federal laws, but even remanded for possible recon-
ciliation of a clear conflict."0 7 In this, De Canas goes further than all its
predecessors.
A. The Factual Setting
The petitioners in De Canas, a husband and wife who were legal
resident aliens, sued the respondents, a farm labor contractor and his fore-
man, in the superior court of Santa Barbara pursuant to section 2805(c) of
the California Labor Code,' which permits civil suits against employers
who violate section 2805(a) by employing illegal aliens. The petitioners
alleged that they were legally admitted to the United States from Honduras
in the mid- 1960's and had for the past five years been employed as agricul-
tural field workers. They asserted that on June 5, 1972, they gave up
previous farm labor employment to accept the respondents' offer of steady
jobs as farm laborers, but that on September 28, 1972, although their per-
formance was satisfactory, they were discharged on the ground that the
respondents had a sufficient supply of labor. Both before and after the
petitioners were discharged, the respondents' work crews were raided by the
United States border patrol, which apprehended fort , illegal aliens in a
six-month period. Either immediately before or soon after raids, the peti-
tioners requested jobs from the respondents but were refused on the ground
that none were available. Finally, the petitioners alleged that the respondents
were wilfully inducing aliens to enter the United States illegally and protect-
ing them from the authorities. 0 9 The petitioners sought reinstatement of
their employment, an injunction against the respondents' wilful employment
of illegal aliens, and both punitive and compensatory damages." 0
The trial court "reluctantly" dismissed the complaint on the ground
105. Id. at 63.
106. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (West Supp. 1976). See note I supra.
107. 424 U.S. at 363-65.
108. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805(c) (West Supp. 1976).
109. The case was determined on a demurrer; the trial court specifically found that
"after hearing the evidence on the preliminary injunction, it is reasonably certain that
plaintiffs could not sustain the factual allegations of their complaint." Appendix to Brief
for Petitioner at 21a, De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
110. Id. at 12a- 14a. In count two of their complaint the petitioners asserted a claim
of unfair competition pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 3369 (West Supp. 1976). Appendix to
Brief for Petitioner at lOa-12a, De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
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that section 2805 was an unconstitutional interference with "a comprehen-
sive regulatory scheme enacted by Congress in the exercise of its exclusive
power over immigration." 11' Furthermore, the court found that the prohibi-
tion against the hiring of aliens who were not "entitled to lawful residence in
the United States, ' was in direct conflict with federal law, which permits
the employment of such aliens in certain circumstances." 3 The California
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that congressional power
was exclusive in the area of immigration," 4 and denied damages in reliance
on San Diego Unions v. Garmon. 5"' The California Supreme Court declined
to review De Canas,"6 but the United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari" 7 to determine "[w]hether section 2805(a) is unconstitutional either
because it is an attempt to regulate immigration and naturalization or be-
cause it is pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause. . . of the Constitution,
by the Immigration and Nationality Act . ".1
B. The Decision
The Court's two-part opinion dealt first with the issue of regulation of
immigration and second with the issue of preemption. The opinion began
with the undisputed assertion that the power to regulate immigration is
exclusively federal. The Court made an important distinction, however,
between the field of immigration, preempted by the federal government, and
the subject of aliens, which is open to valid regulation by the states. The
Court emphasized that state statutes regulating the activities of aliens are not
always to be equated with prohibited state regulation of immigration," 9 and
further noted that if the Constitution of its own force precluded all state
regulation of aliens, there would have been no need in previous cases to
111. Id. at 17a.
112. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805(a) (West Supp. 1976).
113. Appendix to Brief for Petitioner at 18a, Decanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351
(1976).
114. De Canas v. Bica, 40 Cal. App. 3d 976, 980-81, 115 Cal. Rptr. 444, 447
(1974). As the Supreme Court pointed out in its opinion in De Canas, it is unclear
whether the court of appeals held that section 2805 was constitutionally proscribed be-
cause the lower court hinted that Congress could authorize the states to enact such laws.
424 U.S. at 354 n.3.
115. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In Garmon, the Supreme Court had invalidated Califor-
nia's efforts to provide injunctive relief and damages to an employer who was found to
have suffered from an unfair labor practice over which the National Labor Relations
Board had refused to assert jurisdiction.
116. 40 Cal. App. 3d 981, 115 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
117. 422 U.S. 1040 (1975).
118. 424 U.S. at 352-53.
119. Id. at 355.
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discuss the relevant congressional enactments."' 0 Speaking for a unanimous
Court, Justice Brennan defined regulation of immigration as "a determina-
tion of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the
conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.""'2 Using that definition
he found that section 2805(a) was not "a constitutionally proscribed regula-
tion of immigration," 2 and he characterized the statute as local regulation
with only a "speculative and indirect impact on immigration. '"123 Justice
Brennan concluded that "absent congressional action, section 2805 would
not be an invalid state incursion on federal power," because the Constitution
itself does not require preemption of state regulation of aliens.12 4
The Court used the preemption standard it had set forth in Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul:.2 federal regulation of a particular
subject will not preempt state regulation unless "either the nature of the
regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion or. . .Congress has
unmistakably so ordained."'26 Having previously concluded that the subject
matter being regulated by the state was aliens and not immigration, the
Court noted that regulation of employment was clearly within the state's
police power. Citing examples of other state regulations on employment,
such as child labor, health, and safety laws, the Court held that Section 2805
was within "the mainstream of such police power regulation." 27 Reflecting
the public debate over the problem of illegal immigration, Justice Brennan
stressed several arguments used by proponents of stringent measures to curb
illegal immigration. Specifically, he pointed out that illegal aliens take jobs
away from United States citizens, depress wage scales and working condi-
tions, and weaken labor unions. 2 ' The Court took judicial notice of the
particular severity of those problems in California due to illegal immigration
from Mexico. The Court then decided that these problems were local in
nature and that section 2805(a) was, therefore, not preempted on a subject
matter basis.' 29
Turning to the question of preemption by mandate of Congress, Justice
Brennan focused on the scope, detail, wording, and legislative history of the
120. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
121. 424 U.S. at 355.
122. Id. at 356.
123. Id. at 355.
124. Id. at 356.
125. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
126. Id. at 142.
127. 424 U.S. at 356.
128. Id. at 356-57.
129. Id.
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Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).131 In his view, the respondents had
failed to demonstrate a "clear and manifest purpose of Congress" to pre-
empt state regulation of undocumented workers, and an independent review
by the Court had also failed to reveal an indication of such congressional
intent. 13' The Supreme Court labelled as "misplaced"13 the reliance of the
California Court of Appeal on San Diego Unions v. Garmon."' In Garmon
the Supreme Court invalidated California's attempt to provide relief in an
area committed by Congress to the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), but over which the NLRB had declined jurisdiction."' The Court
in Garmon recognized that "in areas that Congress decides require national
uniformity of regulation, Congress may exercise power to exclude any state
regulation, even if harmonious.""' Furthermore, nothing in the INA re-
sembled the NLRB scheme.
The Court in De Canas also rejected the respondents' contention that
section 274 of the INA, which makes it a felony to harbor illegal aliens but
provides that "employment (including the usual and normal practices inci-
dent to employment) shall not be deemed to constitute harboring,' '136 was
evidence of preemptive intent. At best, this is merely "evidence of a
130. Id. at 357-63 (discussing the INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1970)). The Act
was enacte.d over President Truman's veto on January 27, 1952. [1952] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 276. The Court's analysis of the INA is further evidence of the
changing preemption doctrine. The Court rejected the assertion that by sheer comprehen-
siveness the INA preempted the state law: "Given the complexity of the matter addressed
by Congress in [the INA], a detailed statutory scheme was both likely and appropriate,
completely apart from any questions of pre-emptive intent." 424 U.S. at 359-60 (citation
omitted). Thus the Court has finally laid to rest a notion that originated in Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). There, the Court declared that the "scheme of
federal legislation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress
left no room for the states to supplement." Id. at 230.
131. 424 U.S. at 357-58.
132. 424 U.S. at 359 n.7.
133. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). See note 115 and accompanying text supra.
134. Id. NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973), may also indicate why this
reliance was misplaced. There, the Court held that the NLRB, in its determination of
whether a disciplinary fine by a union on a member constitutes an unfair labor practice, is
not authorized to inquire into the reasonableness of the amount of the fine imposed; this is
a matter left for state courts. Garmon's broad rule may thus be in the process of contrac-
tion. See Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 25, 45 U.S.L.W. 4263
(U.S. Mar. 7, 1977); Lodge 76, International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 96 S. Ct. 2548 (1976). Perhaps another
distinguishing feature of Garmon is the efficacy with which the NLRB scheme* operates.
In light of the federal ability in this sphere, the need for valid state legislation is not as
pressing as in other fields. In contrast, the ineffectiveness of the INS in dealing with the
illegal alien problem makes California's need for section 2805 all the more vital.
135. 424 U.S. at 359 (emphasis in original).
136. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(4) (1970).
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peripheral concern with employment of illegal entrants." "I Not only did the
Court find no congressional preemptive intent, but it found that certain 1974
amefidments to the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act (FLCRA) 38
indicated a congressional intent "that states may, to the extent consistent
with federal law, regulate the employment of illegal aliens."' 39 That Act
provides for licensing certification of farm labor contractors and restrains
them from knowingly recruiting or employing "any person who is an alien
not lawfully admitted for permanent residence or who has not been au-
thorized by the Attorney General to accept employment.''140 The 1974
amendments afforded civil relief under the FLCRA, which until then had
been held to be strictly penal in nature.' 4' Most important, section 2051 of
the Act provides that "this chapter and the provisions contained herein are
intended to supplement State action and compliance with this chapter shall
not excuse anyone from compliance with appropriate State law and regula-
tion."1 42 With this, the Court rejected the respondents' contention that by
restricting to farm labor contractors the prohibition of employing aliens not
entitled to lawful residence, Congress was affirming its position that no
other employers were to be punished for the employment of such aliens.' 43
The Court then distinguished the cases of Hines v. Davidowitz144 and
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 145 relied on by the respondents. In Hines, the Court
137. 424 U.S. at 360 (footnote omitted). Similarly, the Court declined to accept the
petitioner's assertion that this proviso, while exempting employment per se from the crime
of harboring, does not purport to immunize an employer who knowingly employs illegal
aliens. Id. at 360 n.9. Petitioners stated: "While there has been no specific judicial in-
terpretation of the word 'harbor' in § 274(a)(3), an examination of the legislative history
demonstrates that the congressional intent was to protect the innocent employer from
prosecution." Petitioner's Reply Brief at 8, De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1970).
They quoted Senator Kilgore, the author of § 274(a)(3), who has stated: "So am I [trying
to strengthen the immigration bill], but at the same time I am trying to do it, not at the
expense of some man who unwittingly or unknowingly . . . hires a man he does not
know to be a wetback, who may be pretty well in the interior of the country, and who is
seeking employment. The man to whom I am referring may need an employee, and hires
the alien. That of itself should not subject him to a penalty. Once he finds out the real
situation, he is knowingly and willfully harboring the man, and the authorities can go
after him." 98 CONG. REC. 794 (1952) (emphasis added).
138. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2041 to -55 (West Supp. 1977).
139. 424 U.S. at 361.
140. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2045(f) (West Supp. 1976).
141. Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890 (10th Cir. 1972). Thus, in the
absence of federal prosecution, the FLCRA was useless to the petitioners.
142. 424 U.S. 362 (construing 7 U.S.C.A. § 2051 (West Supp. 1976)) (emphasis
in original).
143. Respondent's Brief at 20, De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
144. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
145. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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had reviewed the validity of the Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act,
146
whose provisions conflicted in several particulars with the federal Alien
Registration Act. 147 The Court invalidated Pennsylvania's legislation be-
cause it conflicted with supervening federal law, but expressly left open the
question whether federal power in this area is exclusive.148 In Nelson, the
Court determined that the Smith Act,'49 which proscribes advocacy of the
overthrow of any government, superseded all state sedition acts, including
Pennsylvania's.150 The first distinction drawn in De Canas was that Hines
and Nelson involved federal statutes dealing with the exact topic sought to
be regulated by Pennsylvania.' 5 ' Furthermore, in neither case was there
"affirmative evidence. . . that Congress sanctioned concurrent state legis-
lation on the subject covered by the challenged state law,"' 52 whereas the
FLCRA constituted affirmative evidence of congressional sanction of sec-
tion 2805 and similar state legislation. Another difference cited was that
section 2805 regulates local problems, whereas Hines and Nelson dealt with
immigration and foreign affairs, fields in which th federal interest is pre-
dominant.' 53 Thus, in De Canas, the governmental interest advanced is a
state, rather than a federal interest. One last distinction was that section 2805
deals with illegal alien workers, persons whom the federal government has
already declared cannot legally work; Hines and Nelson involved state regu-
lation of aliens who were lawfully in the United States and thus created
conflicts with existing federal laws.
54
Although the Court in De Canas concluded that the California Court of
Appeal was in error in declaring section 2805 unconstitutional as a statute
regulating immigration, there remained unanswered the question whether
the statute was nevertheless unconstitutional because it stood as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
146. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1801-1806 (Purdon Supp. 1940).
147. Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670.
148. 312 U.S. at 62.
149. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970).
150. 350 U.S. at 504.
151. 424 U.S. at 362.
152. Id. at 363.
153. Id. The petitioners argued: "The case at bar is distinguishable from Nelson.
While Nelson involved a potential conflict between two systems aimed at regulating iden-
tical behavior (sedition), the instant case involves federal and state statutes in two (2) dif-
ferent fields-immigration and labor. Moreover, Congress does not condone the behavior
which the California statute prohibits. Therefore, the two statutes do not compete or even
potentially conflict. Rather, they operate in different domains. The federal statute is di-
rected toward regulating immigration and the state statute toward regulating employers
and employment." Petitioner's Reply Brief at 5-6, De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351
(1976).
154. 424 U.S. at 363.
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Congress in enacting the INA. The Court concluded that it could not resolve
that issue on the record before it because the court of appeal had not ad-
dressed that question nor settled certain questions of statutory construction.
Declaring that it sufficed to decide that in enacting the INA Congress had
not precluded state authority to regulate the employment of illegal aliens, 5'
the Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a consideration
of whether section 2805 conflicts with federal law.
A. On Remand
The asserted conflict is contained in subsection (a) of section 2805.
This subsection prohibits the employment of an alien "not entitled to lawful
residence in the United States."' 56 Because there are aliens in the United
States who are not entitled to lawful residence, but whose employment is
nevertheless authorized by the attorney general, 5 ' the application of section
2805(a) to such aliens would unconstitutionally conflict with federal law. In
reality, however, the conflict is nonexistent. Regulations promulgated under
the California statute give the phrase an expansive definition: "An alien
entitled to lawful residence shall mean any non-citizen of the United States
who is in possession of a Form 1-151, Alien Registration Receipt Card, or
any other document issued by the United States Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service which authorizes him to work. ' '11 8 Clearly then, anyone au-
thorized by the federal government to work could legally be hired and
employed in California.
Section 2805 prohibits the employment of illegal aliens only when such
employment "would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers."'
Significantly, the Administrative Code adopts federal standards to interpret
this phrase. 6 ' In sum, it is clear that section 2805 does not create a fatal
conflict. The California regulations accept and incorporate federal law defin-
ing those aliens not entitled to lawful residence who are nonetheless entitled
155. Id. at 365.
156. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805(a) (West Supp. 1976).
157. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(14) (West Supp. 1976).
158. 8 CAL. AD. CODE § 16209 (1972).
159. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805(a) (West Supp. 1976).
160. 8 CAL. AD. CODE § 16209.6 (1972) provides:
"Definition of Adverse Effect. Employment of an alien not entitled to lawful resi-
dence under any of the following circumstances shall be deemed to have an adverse effect
on lawful resident workers:
(a) Employment in any category of employment not enumerated on Schedule A in
Labor Department Regulations 29 C.F.R. § 60.7. Schedule A may be obtained from the
Manpower Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, D.C.
(b) Payment by an employer to such employee of less than the federal or state
minimum wage, whichever is higher."
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to work in the United States. Section 2805 extends federal law to remedy a
local labor problem and to effectuate California's legitimate interest in pro-
tecting its labor force. By enacting section 2805, California was protecting
this traditional state interest without directly affecting federal interests in
light of congressional tolerance of state regulation.
Two recent California cases may have a bearing on the court's interpre-
tation of this legislation on remand. 6' In Dolores Canning-Co. v. How-
ard, '6 a different division of the California Court of Appeal also held
section 2805 unconstitutional, relying in part on San Diego Unions v. Gar-
mon. 163 At least to the extent that this reliance was "misplaced,' ' 64 this
decision is doubtful authority. The Dolores court's second ground for in-
validating section 2805, that it encroaches upon and interferes with a com-
prehensive scheme enacted by Congress pursuant to its exclusive power over
immigration, was explicitly rejected in De Canas."65
The last ground on which the court in Dolores held section 2805 uncon-
stitutional was that the statute's proscription was not limited to those persons
not authorized to work and thus was "in conflict with the federal law in this
area of immigration. 166 This conclusory statement is weak authority on
which to base a decision on remand because, as the Supreme Court pointed
out, the Dolores opinion only quotes the administrative definition in a foot-
note, 67 without elaborating upon "its significance in construing §
2805(a).'1
68
Moreover, the need to uphold section 2805 has been strengthened by
the holding in Alonso v. State Department of Human Resources.69 In sus-
taining the state's denial of employment compensation benefits to an illegal
alien, the California Court of Appeal declared: "If an alien is here unlaw-
fully, he has no rights under the Constitution of the United States to equal
opportunity of employment as enjoyed by lawfully resident aliens. . . and
has no right to work. . . . [A] fortiori an individually illegally in this
country cannot legally be qualified to work here."' 0 The Cofirt also found
161. Alonso v. California, 50 Cal. App. 3d 242, 123 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1975); Do-
lores Canning Co. v. Howard, 40 Cal. App. 3d 673, 115 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1974).
162. 40 Cal. App. 3d 673, 115 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1974).
163. 353 U.S. 26 (1957). See note 133 and accompanying text supra.
164. See text accompanying note 133 supra.
165. 424 U.S. at 355-56. See text accompanying notes 119-24 supra.
166. 40 Cal. App. 3d at 688, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 444 (footnote omitted).
167. Id. at 677 n.3, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 436 n.3.
168. 424 U.S. at 364 n.12.
169. 50 Cal. App. 3d 242, 123 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1492
(1976).
170. Id. at 248, 255, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 540, 544 (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original).
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that it was the intent of Congress that citizens and lawful resident aliens be
entitled to work in those jobs surreptitiously held by illegal aliens. 7'
The key factor in De Canas and Alonso is the ascertainment of the
alien's legal status pursuant to a state law not otherwise involving classifica-
tions of aliens. The interest of the State of California is identical in both
cases. Unless section 2805 is upheld, California will have articulated a dual
legal- standard, one for illegal aliens and another for their employers.' 72
D. The Aftermath of De Canas
De Canas has profound implications for illegal aliens, for California's
neighboring states, and for the doctrines of federalism. The consequences
will materialize and evolve in stages. Initially, other state legislatures will
move to enact similar provisions. New Hampshire and Massachusetts have
already done so. 7 ' By adopting the federal standards, these states will easily
circumvent the problems presently besetting California's section 2805.
Once a provision such as section 2805 is enforced in any one state, an
exodus of illegal aliens will follow. Neighboring states will absorb the
population along with its burdens, thus requiring the enactment of its own
section 2805. This potential domino effect demonstrates the urgent need for
federal legislation.
Consequently, the secondary impact of De Canas will be its catalytic
effect on federal legislation. The House of Representatives has twice ap-
proved legislation barring employment of illegal aliens,'174 but each time the
bills died when the Senate did not act. 7' Approval of one of the currently
pending bills is imminent.' 76
171. Id. at 253, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
172. See id. at 258-59, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 546-47 (Thomson, J., dissenting); cf.
Ayala v. California Unemployment Bd., 54 Cal. App. 3d 676, 126 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1976)
(disability benefits allowed for illegal aliens).
173. 1976 N.H. Laws, ch. 275-A:4 to A:5; MASS. GEN. Lxvs ANN. ch. 149, §
19C (West 1977).
174. H.R. 16188, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 982, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973). H.R. 982 was re-introduced as H.R. 8713, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See
H.R. REP. No. 506, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975).
175. The L.A. Times, Mar. 16, 1976, § II, at 1, col. 1, described Senator James
Eastland (D-Miss.) as "a large plantation owner" who, by keeping the Immigration
Committee inactive, was almost singlehandedly holding up the passage of a federal law
penalizing employers of illegal aliens. Until De Canas, Senator Eastland, Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee and the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization,
opposed legislation similar to section 2805 that did not make provisions similar to the
Bracero program, which made foreign labor available to American farmers during the
1950's. On March 4, 1976, two weeks after De Canas was decided, Senator Eastland
introduced S. 3074, which bars employment of illegal aliens and provides for the limited
importation of foreign labor. S. 3074, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).




De Canas v. Bica1" is an important affirmation of state power. The
Court tacitly balanced the pressing local need for state legislation against the
necessity for federal predominance, and upheld state legislation that had an
indirect impact on immigration despite the admittedly exclusive federal
power to regulate immigration. Moreover, by granting relief to the peti-
tioners, the Court recognized that as employers of illegal aliens, the respon-
dents sought the protection of that which was the very impetus for section
2805, the federal inability to effectively control the massive problems
caused by the presence of illegal aliens in this country.
Whether the California courts will uphold section 2805 is uncertain,
and in the end, immaterial. Once the Supreme Court declared that the
present exercise of federal power does not occupy the field, the enactment of
a valid state law is a mere matter of drafting. Still, section 2805 should be
upheld, for its asserted conflict is illusory at best. The administrative provi-
sions evince an official state policy that accepts and adopts the federal
standards for the employment of aliens. No federal "purposes or ob-
jectives" would be served by striking down the statute.
The validation of section 2805 was imperative in a period of severe
economic recession. Its ultimate validation promises enomic relief for Cali-
fornia's 'legal migrant workers in particular and for California's economy in
general. The anticipated enactment of similar state statutes will require the
passage of a uniform federal statutory scheme to regulate illegal alien em-
ployment. Congressional legislation will not only have the inherent benefits
of a uniform national enforcement policy, but will also avoid the problem
caused by the migration of job-seeking illegal aliens to those states lacking
legislation regulating their employment.
1324(a)(4) (1970) that employment will not constitute harboring, and in effect makes un-
lawful the knowing employment of an "alien in the United States who has not been law-
fully admitted to the United States for permanent residence, unless the employment of
such alien is authorized by the Attorney General." H.R. 8713, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 3
(1970). Enforcement is a three-tiered process. The first step is the issuance of a citation;
second, the imposition of a civil penalty up to $500 for each alien knowingly hired; and
finally, the imposition of a criminal sanction. Id. at 3-5. The bill permits the Attorney
General to initiate a civil action if an employer discriminates against an individual on the
basis of national origin and provides for amnesty, allowing status adjustment under certain
conditions for ah alien continuously physically present in the United States since June 30,
1975. Id. at 5-7. The Eastland Bill, S. 3074, provides for the importation of an alien
worker when not enough domestic workers are available. S. 3074, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1976). Moreover, the bill imposes only civil sanctions against the knowing employment
of undocumented aliens and bars liability if the employer makes a bona fide inquiry. Id.
at 12. A signed statement from the prospective employee attesting that he is not an alien
is also a bar. Id.
177. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
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More significantly, the De Canas case has extensive implications for a
uniform state-oriented preemption doctrine. It is the first unanimous deci-
sion in which the Court has refused to presume preemptive intent in the mere
enactment by Congress of a comprehensive statutory scheme and instead
required some textual evidence of this intent, either in the legislation or its
history. It is a case in which the Court chose to be guided by evidence of
nonpreemption in rejecting judicial doctrine concerning federal legislative
schemes.17 Clearly, less exacting analysis by the Court could have resulted
in the imposition of a categorical federal preemption.
Most importantly, De Canas is a promising milestone in the evolution
of the preemption doctrine. It establishes a clear mode of analysis for future
preemption questions. Once it determines that the Constitution does not
proscribe state legislation, the Court will analyze the subject matter regu-
lated. Only in those cases where no other conclusion is permissible will a
state law be preempted on a subject matter basis. Federal legislation will
preempt nonconflicting state law only where its scope, detail, wording, or
history reveal that "Congress has unmistakably so ordained."' 79 Finally,
any state law conflicting with federal legislation will fail where it stands "as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."1
8 0
The Court's desire to "reconcile the operation of both statutory
schemes with one another"' 8' portends a period wherein state legislation
will be permitted to supplement federal legislative schemes. Such a period
will provide a welcome opportunity for the resolution of the myriad social
problems with which the federal government is presently unable to deal.
178. The Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens stated: "Our official
commitment is to an exclusionary policy founded in history and domestic political consid-
erations which allows approximately 400,000 foreign-born to take up permanent legal re-
sidence in this country per annum. The de facto situation is quite the opposite in that a
combination of legal loopholes and incentives, enforcement inadequacies, and interna-
tional push-pull forces have considerably eased limitations on immigration so that in prac-
tice we have a very open immigration system. Analysis of this combination of factors
leads inevitably to the conclusion that a trend has been established which is likely to grow
if present circumstances persist." DOMESTIC COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 237.
179. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
In the most recent preemption decision, the Supreme Court, relying on De Canas, held
that a California consumer labeling statute was invalid because of the express preemptive
provisions of the Federal Wholesale Meat Act, 21 U.S.C. § 678 (1970). Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 97 S. Ct. 1305 (1977).
180. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
181. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127
(1973).
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